The Dynamics of Deterrence
Because punishment is scarce, costly, and painful, optimal enforcement strategies will minimize the amount of actual punishment required to effectuate deterrence. If potential offenders are sufficiently deterrable, increasing the conditional probability of punishment (given violation) can reduce the...
| Publié dans: | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. - National Academy of Sciences. - 106(2009), 34, Seite 14230-14235 |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Autres auteurs: | , |
| Format: | Article en ligne |
| Langue: | English |
| Publié: |
2009
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| Accès à la collection: | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
| Sujets: | crime enforcement game theory positive feedback tipping Political science Economics Social sciences Behavioral sciences Mathematics |
| Accès en ligne |
Volltext |