The Dynamics of Deterrence

Because punishment is scarce, costly, and painful, optimal enforcement strategies will minimize the amount of actual punishment required to effectuate deterrence. If potential offenders are sufficiently deterrable, increasing the conditional probability of punishment (given violation) can reduce the...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. - National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. - 106(2009), 34, Seite 14230-14235
1. Verfasser:	Kleiman, Mark (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Kilmer, Beau, Schelling, Thomas C.
Format:	Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	2009
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:	Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Schlagworte:	crime enforcement game theory positive feedback tipping Political science Economics Social sciences Behavioral sciences Mathematics Law


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520			\|a Because punishment is scarce, costly, and painful, optimal enforcement strategies will minimize the amount of actual punishment required to effectuate deterrence. If potential offenders are sufficiently deterrable, increasing the conditional probability of punishment (given violation) can reduce the amount of punishment actually inflicted, by "tipping" a situation from its high-violation equilibrium to its low-violation equilibrium. Compared to random or "equal opportunity" enforcement, dynamically concentrated sanctions can reduce the punishment level necessary to tip the system, especially if preceded by warnings. Game theory and some simple and robust Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate these results, which, in addition to their potential for reducing crime and incarceration, may have implications for both management and regulation.
650		4	\|a crime
650		4	\|a enforcement
650		4	\|a game theory
650		4	\|a positive feedback
650		4	\|a tipping
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650		4	\|a Social sciences \|x Population studies \|x Human populations \|x Persons \|x Criminals
650		4	\|a Social sciences \|x Communications \|x Communicative content \|x Warnings
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650		4	\|a Mathematics \|x Pure mathematics \|x Probability theory \|x Probabilities \|x Conditional probabilities
650		4	\|a Law \|x Criminal law \|x Criminal justice \|x Criminal punishment
650		4	\|a Political science \|x Politics \|x International politics \|x International relations \|x International disputes \|x International sanctions \|x Trade sanctions \|x Economic sanctions
650		4	\|a Economics \|x Microeconomics \|x Economic costs and benefits \|x Economic costs \|x Compliance costs
650		4	\|a Social sciences \|x Population studies \|x Human populations \|x Persons \|x Criminals
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650		4	\|a Mathematics \|x Applied mathematics \|x Game theory
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650		4	\|a Mathematics \|x Applied mathematics \|x Game theory \|x Nash equilibrium
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650		4	\|a Law \|x Criminal law \|x Criminal justice \|x Criminal punishment
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700	1		\|a Schelling, Thomas C. \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
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