The Dynamics of Deterrence
Because punishment is scarce, costly, and painful, optimal enforcement strategies will minimize the amount of actual punishment required to effectuate deterrence. If potential offenders are sufficiently deterrable, increasing the conditional probability of punishment (given violation) can reduce the...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. - National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. - 106(2009), 34, Seite 14230-14235 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
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2009
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
| Schlagworte: | crime enforcement game theory positive feedback tipping Political science Economics Social sciences Behavioral sciences Mathematics |
| Online verfügbar |
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