What can we learn from the collapse of the European constitutional project?

What can we learn from the collapse of the European constitutional project?

Abstract The draft European constitution sought to legitimate the EU by inducing more popular deliberation about Europe’s future. This strategy was doomed to failure because it is inconsistent with basic empirical social science about how advanced democracies work. Salient political rhetoric and inc...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Politische Vierteljahresschrift. - VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1960. - 47(2006), 2 vom: 01. Juni, Seite 219-241
1. Verfasser: Moravcsik, Andrew (VerfasserIn)
Format: Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2006
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Politische Vierteljahresschrift
Schlagworte:Constitutional Reform Draft Constitution Democratic Deficit Empirical Social Science European Social Policy
LEADER 01000caa a22002652 4500
001 OLC2055717618
003 DE-627
005 20230303031241.0
007 tu
008 200819s2006 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1007/s11615-006-0037-7  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)OLC2055717618 
035 |a (DE-He213)s11615-006-0037-7-p 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rakwb 
041 |a eng 
082 0 4 |a 320  |q VZ 
082 0 4 |a 320  |q VZ 
084 |a 3,6  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Moravcsik, Andrew  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a What can we learn from the collapse of the European constitutional project? 
264 1 |c 2006 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen  |b n  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Band  |b nc  |2 rdacarrier 
500 |a © VS Verlag 2006 
520 |a Abstract The draft European constitution sought to legitimate the EU by inducing more popular deliberation about Europe’s future. This strategy was doomed to failure because it is inconsistent with basic empirical social science about how advanced democracies work. Salient political rhetoric and increased opportunities to participate do not, as a rule, generate more intensive and informed public deliberation or greater public trust, identity and legitimacy — particularly where the issues in question are not highly salient. Two conclusions follow. First, the failure of constitutional reform is, paradoxically, evidence of the success and stability of the existing “European constitutional settlement.” The rhetoric of federalism has not changed to reflect this new reality. Second, prescriptive analysis of real-world constitutional reform requires that normative theorists draw more heavily on empirical social science in order to ascertain to what extent institutions actually have the consequences ideally ascribed to them. 
650 4 |a Constitutional Reform 
650 4 |a Draft Constitution 
650 4 |a Democratic Deficit 
650 4 |a Empirical Social Science 
650 4 |a European Social Policy 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Politische Vierteljahresschrift  |d VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1960  |g 47(2006), 2 vom: 01. Juni, Seite 219-241  |w (DE-627)129459607  |w (DE-600)200397-1  |w (DE-576)01482339X  |x 0032-3470  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:47  |g year:2006  |g number:2  |g day:01  |g month:06  |g pages:219-241 
856 4 1 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-006-0037-7  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
912 |a GBV_USEFLAG_A 
912 |a SYSFLAG_A 
912 |a GBV_OLC 
912 |a SSG-OLC-POL 
912 |a SSG-OLC-ZGE 
912 |a SSG-OLC-HIS 
912 |a SSG-OLC-IBL 
912 |a GBV_ILN_11 
912 |a GBV_ILN_20 
912 |a GBV_ILN_21 
912 |a GBV_ILN_22 
912 |a GBV_ILN_24 
912 |a GBV_ILN_26 
912 |a GBV_ILN_31 
912 |a GBV_ILN_39 
912 |a GBV_ILN_40 
912 |a GBV_ILN_49 
912 |a GBV_ILN_60 
912 |a GBV_ILN_62 
912 |a GBV_ILN_65 
912 |a GBV_ILN_69 
912 |a GBV_ILN_70 
912 |a GBV_ILN_72 
912 |a GBV_ILN_77 
912 |a GBV_ILN_90 
912 |a GBV_ILN_110 
912 |a GBV_ILN_119 
912 |a GBV_ILN_120 
912 |a GBV_ILN_121 
912 |a GBV_ILN_130 
912 |a GBV_ILN_131 
912 |a GBV_ILN_147 
912 |a GBV_ILN_160 
912 |a GBV_ILN_193 
912 |a GBV_ILN_213 
912 |a GBV_ILN_227 
912 |a GBV_ILN_267 
912 |a GBV_ILN_276 
912 |a GBV_ILN_285 
912 |a GBV_ILN_350 
912 |a GBV_ILN_603 
912 |a GBV_ILN_607 
912 |a GBV_ILN_636 
912 |a GBV_ILN_640 
912 |a GBV_ILN_694 
912 |a GBV_ILN_754 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2002 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2004 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2005 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2006 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2007 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2008 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2010 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2011 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2012 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2014 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2015 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2018 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2020 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2023 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2024 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2026 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2031 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2032 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2035 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2037 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2038 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2044 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2085 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2105 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2139 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2150 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2162 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2206 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2508 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4012 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4027 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4028 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4029 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4035 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4036 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4046 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4082 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4103 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4112 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4116 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4125 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4126 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4193 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4238 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4247 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4249 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4251 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4266 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4277 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4305 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4306 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4307 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4310 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4311 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4314 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4315 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4316 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4317 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4318 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4319 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4320 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4321 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4322 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4323 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4324 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4325 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4326 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4329 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4334 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4346 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4385 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4393 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4700 
951 |a AR 
952 |d 47  |j 2006  |e 2  |b 01  |c 06  |h 219-241