Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion

This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both whe...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Annals of Economics and Statistics. - GENES. - (2020), 137, Seite 3-30
1. Verfasser: Forges, Françoise (VerfasserIn)
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2020
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Annals of Economics and Statistics
Schlagworte:Incomplete Information Repeated Game Sender-Receiver Game Bayesian Persuasion Social sciences Mathematics Political science Applied sciences Economics
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520 |a This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both when the agents monitoring information can lie ("cheap talk") and when they cannot ("persuasion"). JEL Codes: C72, C73, D83, B21. 
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