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211231s2020 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c |
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|a (DE-627)JST131814583
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|a (JST)annaeconstat2009.137.0003
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|a DE-627
|b ger
|c DE-627
|e rakwb
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|a eng
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|a Forges, Françoise
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
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|a Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion
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|c 2020
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|a Text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|b c
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|a This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both when the agents monitoring information can lie ("cheap talk") and when they cannot ("persuasion"). JEL Codes: C72, C73, D83, B21.
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|a © ANNALS OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
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|a Incomplete Information
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|a Repeated Game
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|a Sender-Receiver Game
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|a Bayesian Persuasion
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|a Social sciences
|x Communications
|x Negotiation
|x Negotiation strategies
|x Cheap talk
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4 |
|a Mathematics
|x Applied mathematics
|x Game theory
|x Nash equilibrium
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650 |
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4 |
|a Mathematics
|x Applied mathematics
|x Game theory
|x Game theory games
|x Economic games
|x Repeated games
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650 |
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4 |
|a Mathematics
|x Applied mathematics
|x Game theory
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650 |
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4 |
|a Social sciences
|x Communications
|x Rhetoric
|x Discourse
|x Argumentation
|x Persuasion
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650 |
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4 |
|a Political science
|x Political philosophy
|x Social contract
|x State of nature
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650 |
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4 |
|a Applied sciences
|x Engineering
|x Telecommunications
|x Data transmission
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650 |
|
4 |
|a Mathematics
|x Applied mathematics
|x Statistics
|x Applied statistics
|x Descriptive statistics
|x Statistical distributions
|x Distribution functions
|x Probability distributions
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650 |
|
4 |
|a Economics
|x Microeconomics
|x Economic utility
|x Utility functions
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650 |
|
4 |
|a Social sciences
|x Communications
|x Semiotics
|x Signals
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650 |
|
4 |
|a Social sciences
|x Communications
|x Negotiation
|x Negotiation strategies
|x Cheap talk
|
650 |
|
4 |
|a Mathematics
|x Applied mathematics
|x Game theory
|x Nash equilibrium
|
650 |
|
4 |
|a Mathematics
|x Applied mathematics
|x Game theory
|x Game theory games
|x Economic games
|x Repeated games
|
650 |
|
4 |
|a Mathematics
|x Applied mathematics
|x Game theory
|
650 |
|
4 |
|a Social sciences
|x Communications
|x Rhetoric
|x Discourse
|x Argumentation
|x Persuasion
|
650 |
|
4 |
|a Political science
|x Political philosophy
|x Social contract
|x State of nature
|
650 |
|
4 |
|a Applied sciences
|x Engineering
|x Telecommunications
|x Data transmission
|
650 |
|
4 |
|a Mathematics
|x Applied mathematics
|x Statistics
|x Applied statistics
|x Descriptive statistics
|x Statistical distributions
|x Distribution functions
|x Probability distributions
|
650 |
|
4 |
|a Economics
|x Microeconomics
|x Economic utility
|x Utility functions
|
650 |
|
4 |
|a Social sciences
|x Communications
|x Semiotics
|x Signals
|
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|
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|a research-article
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0 |
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|i Enthalten in
|t Annals of Economics and Statistics
|d GENES
|g (2020), 137, Seite 3-30
|w (DE-627)791048853
|w (DE-600)2777986-5
|x 19683863
|7 nnns
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1 |
8 |
|g year:2020
|g number:137
|g pages:3-30
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|u https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.137.0003
|3 Volltext
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|j 2020
|e 137
|h 3-30
|