Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion
This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both whe...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Annals of Economics and Statistics. - GENES. - (2020), 137, Seite 3-30 |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2020
|
| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Annals of Economics and Statistics |
| Schlagworte: | Incomplete Information Repeated Game Sender-Receiver Game Bayesian Persuasion Social sciences Mathematics Political science Applied sciences Economics |
| Online verfügbar |
Volltext |