|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
01000caa a22002652 4500 |
| 001 |
JST123493242 |
| 003 |
DE-627 |
| 005 |
20240625065655.0 |
| 007 |
cr uuu---uuuuu |
| 008 |
240126s2018 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c |
| 035 |
|
|
|a (DE-627)JST123493242
|
| 035 |
|
|
|a (JST)26517699
|
| 040 |
|
|
|a DE-627
|b ger
|c DE-627
|e rakwb
|
| 041 |
|
|
|a eng
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Buccella, Domenico
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
|
| 245 |
1 |
2 |
|a A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO THE CHOICE OF UNION-OLIGOPOLY BARGAINING AGENDA
|
| 264 |
|
1 |
|c 2018
|
| 336 |
|
|
|a Text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
|
| 337 |
|
|
|a Computermedien
|b c
|2 rdamedia
|
| 338 |
|
|
|a Online-Ressource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
|
| 520 |
|
|
|a This paper investigates the selection of the bargaining agenda in a unionized industry with decentralized negotiations for different competition modes. The firms choose the agenda (right-to-manage, RTM, versus efficient bargaining, EB), considering alternative timing of the bargaining game in the case of mixed duopoly. In fact, the EB (RTM) firm can be either Stackelberg wage follower (leader) or Stackelberg output leader (follower). A two-stage game is developed in which the typology as well as the timing of the negotiations is endogenous. It is shown that, in pure strategies, no equilibria arise for a wide set of the parameters’ space while RTM appears as the unique equilibrium agenda for a different combination of the parameters; moreover, multiple, asymmetric equilibria emerge in a limited area of the parameters’ space. These results are in sharp contrast to the received literature in which EB can arise as an industry bargaining institution in equilibrium. Este artículo investiga la selección de la agenda de negociación en una industria sindicalizada con negociaciones descentralizadas para diferentes modos de competencia. Las empresas eligen la agenda (negociación con derecho de administrar, NDA, frente a negociación eficiente, NE) considerando casos alternativos de la sucesión de eventos en el juego de negociación con duopolio mixto. De hecho, la empresa NE (NDA) puede ser seguidora de salarios Stackelberg (líder) o líder de cantidades Stackelberg (seguidora). Se desarrolla un juego de dos etapas en el que la tipología y el momento de las negociaciones son endógenos. Se muestra que en estrategias puras no surgen equilibrios para un amplio conjunto del espacio de los parámetros, mientras que NDA aparece como la agenda de equilibrio única para una combinación diferente de los parámetros; además, los equilibrios múltiples y asimétricos emergen en un área limitada del espacio de los parámetros. Estos resultados contrastan con la literatura existente, en la que NE puede surgir como una institución de negociación de la industria en equilibrio.
|
| 540 |
|
|
|a © 2018 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a Efficient bargaining
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a right-to-manage
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a union-oligopoly bargaining agenda
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a negociación eficiente
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a negociación con derecho de administrar
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a agenda de negociación del oligopolio sindical
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a Mathematics
|x Applied mathematics
|x Game theory
|x Nash equilibrium
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a Economics
|x Economic disciplines
|x Financial economics
|x Financial market structures
|x Economic competition
|x Imperfect competition
|x Oligopolies
|x Duopolies
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a Economics
|x Economic disciplines
|x Labor economics
|x Employment
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a Social sciences
|x Communications
|x Negotiation
|x Bargaining
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a Law
|x Civil law
|x Contract law
|x Contracts
|x Union contracts
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a Social sciences
|x Communications
|x Negotiation
|x Bargaining
|x Bargaining unit
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a Business
|x Business administration
|x Employee relations
|x Labor management relations
|x Labor negotiations
|x Collective bargaining
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a Social sciences
|x Communications
|x Negotiation
|x Bargaining
|x Bargaining power
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a Economics
|x Economic disciplines
|x Labor economics
|x Labor
|x Workforce
|x Organized labor
|x Labor unionization
|x Labor unions
|x Industrial unions
|
| 650 |
|
4 |
|a Economics
|x Economic policy
|x Trade policy
|x Strategic bargaining
|
| 655 |
|
4 |
|a research-article
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Fanti, Luciano
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
|
| 773 |
0 |
8 |
|i Enthalten in
|t Investigación Económica
|d Facultad de Economía, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)
|g 77(2018), 305, Seite 97-120
|w (DE-627)612652823
|w (DE-600)2523762-7
|x 25942360
|7 nnns
|
| 773 |
1 |
8 |
|g volume:77
|g year:2018
|g number:305
|g pages:97-120
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://www.jstor.org/stable/26517699
|3 Volltext
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_USEFLAG_A
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a SYSFLAG_A
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_JST
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_11
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_20
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_22
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_23
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_24
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_31
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_39
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_40
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_60
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_62
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_63
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_65
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_69
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_70
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_73
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_90
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_95
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_100
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_101
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_105
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_110
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_151
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_161
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_187
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_206
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_213
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_230
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_285
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_293
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_370
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_374
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_602
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_702
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2001
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2003
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2005
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2006
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2007
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2008
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2009
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2010
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2011
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2014
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2015
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2018
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2020
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2021
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2026
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2027
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2044
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2050
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2056
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2057
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2061
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2107
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2111
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2190
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2949
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_2950
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4012
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4035
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4037
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4046
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4112
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4125
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4126
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4242
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4249
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4251
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4305
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4306
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4307
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4313
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4322
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4323
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4324
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4325
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4326
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4335
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4338
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4346
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4367
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4393
|
| 912 |
|
|
|a GBV_ILN_4700
|
| 951 |
|
|
|a AR
|
| 952 |
|
|
|d 77
|j 2018
|e 305
|h 97-120
|