Ownership, Organization, and Private Firms' Efficient Use of Resources
The principal--agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non-listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 × 2 framewo...
Veröffentlicht in: | Strategic Management Journal. - John Wiley & Sons. - 24(2003), 7, Seite 667-675 |
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Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
2003
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Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Strategic Management Journal |
Schlagworte: | private firms productive efficiency agency theory data envelopment analysis (DEA) Business Economics Philosophy Applied sciences Behavioral sciences |
Zusammenfassung: | The principal--agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non-listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 × 2 framework distinguishing owner-controlled vs. agent-led firms from firms with a flat vs. multilayer organization. Our findings provide highly contrasted results and raise important issues for further study of private firms. |
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ISSN: | 10970266 |