Collaborative Product and Market Development: Theoretical Implications and Experimental Evidence

In alliances jointly developing product and market, we first investigate how (a) the number of networks competing to develop a product, (b) the number of alternative technology platforms, and (c) market sensitivity to product development expenditures affect investments of partnering firms. We find t...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Marketing Science. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - 24(2005), 3, Seite 396-414
1. Verfasser:	Amaldoss, Wilfred (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Rapoport, Amnon
Format:	Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	2005
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:	Marketing Science
Schlagworte:	new product research alliances experimental economics game theory two-stage competition Social sciences Economics Business Behavioral sciences Applied sciences Law


LEADER	01000caa a22002652 4500
001	JST056349637
003	DE-627
005	20240622022700.0
007	cr uuu---uuuuu
008	150324s2005 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c
035			\|a (DE-627)JST056349637
035			\|a (JST)40056970
040			\|a DE-627 \|b ger \|c DE-627 \|e rakwb
041			\|a eng
100	1		\|a Amaldoss, Wilfred \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
245	1	0	\|a Collaborative Product and Market Development: Theoretical Implications and Experimental Evidence
264		1	\|c 2005
336			\|a Text \|b txt \|2 rdacontent
337			\|a Computermedien \|b c \|2 rdamedia
338			\|a Online-Ressource \|b cr \|2 rdacarrier
520			\|a In alliances jointly developing product and market, we first investigate how (a) the number of networks competing to develop a product, (b) the number of alternative technology platforms, and (c) market sensitivity to product development expenditures affect investments of partnering firms. We find that, in equilibrium, when the number of either competing networks or technologies increases, investments are more likely to be directed toward market, rather than product, development. Second, we consider the case in which firms continue to jointly develop a product but compete individually in the market. Our analysis suggests that forcing alliance partners to compete individually might not attenuate the underinvestment problem associated with new product alliances. Third, we extend the model to consider sequential market entry with rewards based on the order of entry, technology spillover, endogenous market size, and asymmetric technologies. Finally, key predictions of the basic model are tested in two experiments. The aggregate results provide strong support to the qualitative implications of the equilibrium solution but only mixed support to its quantitative predictions.
540			\|a Copyright 2005 INFORMS
650		4	\|a new product research
650		4	\|a alliances
650		4	\|a experimental economics
650		4	\|a game theory
650		4	\|a two-stage competition
650		4	\|a Social sciences \|x Development studies \|x Market development
650		4	\|a Economics \|x Economic disciplines \|x Financial economics \|x Finance \|x Financial investments
650		4	\|a Business \|x Business engineering \|x Research and development \|x Product development
650		4	\|a Economics \|x Economic disciplines \|x Financial economics \|x Finance \|x Financial investments \|x Net investment
650		4	\|a Behavioral sciences \|x Human behavior \|x Social behavior \|x Social interaction \|x Cooperation \|x Alliances
650		4	\|a Business \|x Business administration \|x Corporate communications \|x External corporate communications \|x Marketing
650		4	\|a Applied sciences \|x Technology
650		4	\|a Economics \|x Macroeconomics \|x Aggregate economy \|x Market economics \|x Market equilibrium
650		4	\|a Law \|x Civil law \|x Property law \|x Intellectual property law \|x Patent law \|x Patents
650		4	\|a Economics \|x Economic disciplines \|x Financial economics \|x Finance \|x Financial investments \|x Investment value
650		4	\|a Social sciences \|x Development studies \|x Market development
650		4	\|a Economics \|x Economic disciplines \|x Financial economics \|x Finance \|x Financial investments
650		4	\|a Business \|x Business engineering \|x Research and development \|x Product development
650		4	\|a Economics \|x Economic disciplines \|x Financial economics \|x Finance \|x Financial investments \|x Net investment
650		4	\|a Behavioral sciences \|x Human behavior \|x Social behavior \|x Social interaction \|x Cooperation \|x Alliances
650		4	\|a Business \|x Business administration \|x Corporate communications \|x External corporate communications \|x Marketing
650		4	\|a Applied sciences \|x Technology
650		4	\|a Economics \|x Macroeconomics \|x Aggregate economy \|x Market economics \|x Market equilibrium
650		4	\|a Law \|x Civil law \|x Property law \|x Intellectual property law \|x Patent law \|x Patents
650		4	\|a Economics \|x Economic disciplines \|x Financial economics \|x Finance \|x Financial investments \|x Investment value
655		4	\|a research-article
700	1		\|a Rapoport, Amnon \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
773	0	8	\|i Enthalten in \|t Marketing Science \|d Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences \|g 24(2005), 3, Seite 396-414 \|w (DE-627)320627799 \|w (DE-600)2023536-7 \|x 1526548X \|7 nnns
773	1	8	\|g volume:24 \|g year:2005 \|g number:3 \|g pages:396-414
856	4	0	\|u https://www.jstor.org/stable/40056970 \|3 Volltext
912			\|a GBV_USEFLAG_A
912			\|a SYSFLAG_A
912			\|a GBV_JST
912			\|a GBV_ILN_11
912			\|a GBV_ILN_20
912			\|a GBV_ILN_22
912			\|a GBV_ILN_23
912			\|a GBV_ILN_24
912			\|a GBV_ILN_31
912			\|a GBV_ILN_32
912			\|a GBV_ILN_39
912			\|a GBV_ILN_40
912			\|a GBV_ILN_60
912			\|a GBV_ILN_62
912			\|a GBV_ILN_63
912			\|a GBV_ILN_65
912			\|a GBV_ILN_69
912			\|a GBV_ILN_70
912			\|a GBV_ILN_90
912			\|a GBV_ILN_95
912			\|a GBV_ILN_100
912			\|a GBV_ILN_110
912			\|a GBV_ILN_120
912			\|a GBV_ILN_152
912			\|a GBV_ILN_187
912			\|a GBV_ILN_224
912			\|a GBV_ILN_285
912			\|a GBV_ILN_374
912			\|a GBV_ILN_702
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2001
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2003
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2005
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2006
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2007
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2008
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2009
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2010
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2011
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2014
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2015
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2018
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2020
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2021
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2026
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2027
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2034
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2044
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2048
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2050
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2055
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2056
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2057
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2059
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2061
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2065
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2068
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2106
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2107
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2108
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2111
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2112
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2113
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2118
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2122
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2129
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2143
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2147
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2148
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2152
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2153
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2190
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2232
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2472
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2935
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2940
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2949
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2950
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4012
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4035
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4037
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4046
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4112
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4125
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4126
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4242
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4246
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4249
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4251
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4305
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4306
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4307
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4313
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4322
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4323
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4324
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4325
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4326
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4335
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4338
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4346
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4393
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4700
951			\|a AR
952			\|d 24 \|j 2005 \|e 3 \|h 396-414