On Manufacturing/Marketing Incentives

On Manufacturing/Marketing Incentives

Stereotypically, marketing is mainly concerned about satisfying customers and manufacturing is mainly interested in factory efficiency. Using the principal-agent (agency) paradigm, which assumes that the marketing and manufacturing managers of the firm will act in their self-interest, we seek incent...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Management Science. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, 1954. - 37(1991), 9, Seite 1166-1181
1. Verfasser: Porteus, Evan L. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Whang, Seungjin
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 1991
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Management Science
Schlagworte:Manufacturing/Marketing Incentives Agency Theory Hidden Effort Newsvendor Model Delegation Futures Market Franchising Business Economics Applied sciences Mathematics
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520 |a Stereotypically, marketing is mainly concerned about satisfying customers and manufacturing is mainly interested in factory efficiency. Using the principal-agent (agency) paradigm, which assumes that the marketing and manufacturing managers of the firm will act in their self-interest, we seek incentive plans that will induce those managers to act so that the owner of the firm can attain as much as possible of the residual returns. One optimal incentive plan can be interpreted as follows: The owner subcontracts to pay the manufacturing manager a fixed rate for all capacity he delivers. Each marketing manager receives all of the returns from his product. In turn, all managers pay a fixed fee to the owner. Under this plan, the marketing managers will often complain about the stock level decisions, even though these levels are announced in advance. Under a revised plan, the owner can eliminate such complaints by delegating the stocking decisions to the respective marketing managers, without any loss. This plan is interpreted as requiring the owner to make a futures market for manufacturing capacity, paying the manufacturing manager the expected marginal value for each unit of capacity delivered, receiving the realized marginal value from the marketing managers, and losing money on average in the process. 
540 |a Copyright 1991 The Institute of Management Sciences 
650 4 |a Manufacturing/Marketing Incentives 
650 4 |a Agency Theory 
650 4 |a Hidden Effort 
650 4 |a Newsvendor Model 
650 4 |a Delegation 
650 4 |a Futures Market 
650 4 |a Franchising 
650 4 |a Business  |x Business administration  |x Human resources  |x Employee motivation  |x Productivity incentives  |x Incentive plans 
650 4 |a Business  |x Business administration  |x Corporate communications  |x External corporate communications  |x Marketing 
650 4 |a Business  |x Business operations  |x Commerce  |x Financial transactions  |x Payments  |x Fees 
650 4 |a Economics  |x Economic research  |x Economic analysis  |x Economic value  |x Marginal value 
650 4 |a Business  |x Business administration  |x Corporate communications  |x External corporate communications  |x Marketing  |x Marketing management 
650 4 |a Economics  |x Economic disciplines  |x Financial economics  |x Financial markets  |x Futures markets 
650 4 |a Business  |x Business structures  |x Business partnerships  |x Franchise agreements 
650 4 |a Applied sciences  |x Computer science  |x Computer programming  |x Mathematical programming  |x Nonlinear programming  |x Objective functions 
650 4 |a Economics  |x Economic disciplines  |x Financial economics  |x Finance  |x Financial management  |x Financial risk 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Mathematical procedures  |x Mathematical optimization  |x Optimal solutions 
655 4 |a research-article 
700 1 |a Whang, Seungjin  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Management Science  |d Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, 1954  |g 37(1991), 9, Seite 1166-1181  |w (DE-627)320623602  |w (DE-600)2023019-9  |x 15265501  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:37  |g year:1991  |g number:9  |g pages:1166-1181 
856 4 0 |u https://www.jstor.org/stable/2632332  |3 Volltext 
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952 |d 37  |j 1991  |e 9  |h 1166-1181