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|a (JST)2634600
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|a DE-627
|b ger
|c DE-627
|e rakwb
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|a eng
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|a Umanath, Narayan S.
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
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|a The Effect of Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry on the Structure of Compensation Contracts: A Test of Competing Models
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|c 1996
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|a Text
|b txt
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|a Computermedien
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|a This research note reports results of a laboratory experiment conducted as a follow-up investigation of an earlier study by Umanath, Ray and Campbell (1993). Here, we focus on a specific unexpected result of Umanath et al. who found evidence contradicting the theoretical prediction with respect to the impact of environmental uncertainty on the composition of compensation contracts. Umanath et al., in retrospect, offered an explanation for their unexpected finding based on an alternative theory under the same agency framework. Our results not only ratify the alternative explanation offered by Umanath et al., but also identify information symmetry/asymmetry as the contingent factor capable of reconciling the apparently contradicting predictions of the two agency-based theories used in this research.
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|a Copyright 1996 Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
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|a Compensation Plans
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|a Agency Theory
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|a Incentive Contracts
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|a Salary-Incentive Mix
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|a Information Asymmetry
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|a Business
|x Business administration
|x Human resources
|x Employee compensation
|x Salary
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|a Behavioral sciences
|x Behavioral economics
|x Contract theory
|x Information asymmetry
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|a Behavioral sciences
|x Behavioral economics
|x Behavioral finance
|x Financial incentives
|x Contract incentives
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|a Physical sciences
|x Physics
|x Microphysics
|x Quantum mechanics
|x Uncertainty principle
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|a Political science
|x Political philosophy
|x Social contract
|x State of nature
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|a Economics
|x Economic disciplines
|x Financial economics
|x Finance
|x Financial analysis
|x Risk management
|x Risk aversion
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|a Behavioral sciences
|x Behavioral economics
|x Contract theory
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|a Business
|x Business administration
|x Human resources
|x Employee motivation
|x Productivity incentives
|x Incentive pay
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|a Mathematics
|x Applied mathematics
|x Statistics
|x Applied statistics
|x Inferential statistics
|x Expected values
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|a Economics
|x Economic disciplines
|x Applied economics
|x Economic modeling
|x Economic models
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|a research-article
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1 |
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|a Ray, Manash R.
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
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|a Campbell, Terry L.
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
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|i Enthalten in
|t Management Science
|d Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, 1954
|g 42(1996), 6, Seite 868-874
|w (DE-627)320623602
|w (DE-600)2023019-9
|x 15265501
|7 nnns
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|g volume:42
|g year:1996
|g number:6
|g pages:868-874
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|u https://www.jstor.org/stable/2634600
|3 Volltext
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|d 42
|j 1996
|e 6
|h 868-874
|