The Effect of Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry on the Structure of Compensation Contracts: A Test of Competing Models

This research note reports results of a laboratory experiment conducted as a follow-up investigation of an earlier study by Umanath, Ray and Campbell (1993). Here, we focus on a specific unexpected result of Umanath et al. who found evidence contradicting the theoretical prediction with respect to t...

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Veröffentlicht in:Management Science. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, 1954. - 42(1996), 6, Seite 868-874
1. Verfasser: Umanath, Narayan S. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Ray, Manash R., Campbell, Terry L.
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 1996
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Management Science
Schlagworte:Compensation Plans Agency Theory Incentive Contracts Salary-Incentive Mix Information Asymmetry Business Behavioral sciences Physical sciences Political science Economics Mathematics
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520 |a This research note reports results of a laboratory experiment conducted as a follow-up investigation of an earlier study by Umanath, Ray and Campbell (1993). Here, we focus on a specific unexpected result of Umanath et al. who found evidence contradicting the theoretical prediction with respect to the impact of environmental uncertainty on the composition of compensation contracts. Umanath et al., in retrospect, offered an explanation for their unexpected finding based on an alternative theory under the same agency framework. Our results not only ratify the alternative explanation offered by Umanath et al., but also identify information symmetry/asymmetry as the contingent factor capable of reconciling the apparently contradicting predictions of the two agency-based theories used in this research. 
540 |a Copyright 1996 Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences 
650 4 |a Compensation Plans 
650 4 |a Agency Theory 
650 4 |a Incentive Contracts 
650 4 |a Salary-Incentive Mix 
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650 4 |a Physical sciences  |x Physics  |x Microphysics  |x Quantum mechanics  |x Uncertainty principle 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Political philosophy  |x Social contract  |x State of nature 
650 4 |a Economics  |x Economic disciplines  |x Financial economics  |x Finance  |x Financial analysis  |x Risk management  |x Risk aversion 
650 4 |a Behavioral sciences  |x Behavioral economics  |x Contract theory 
650 4 |a Business  |x Business administration  |x Human resources  |x Employee motivation  |x Productivity incentives  |x Incentive pay 
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655 4 |a research-article 
700 1 |a Ray, Manash R.  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Campbell, Terry L.  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
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952 |d 42  |j 1996  |e 6  |h 868-874