The Effect of Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry on the Structure of Compensation Contracts: A Test of Competing Models
This research note reports results of a laboratory experiment conducted as a follow-up investigation of an earlier study by Umanath, Ray and Campbell (1993). Here, we focus on a specific unexpected result of Umanath et al. who found evidence contradicting the theoretical prediction with respect to t...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Management Science. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, 1954. - 42(1996), 6, Seite 868-874 |
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| Weitere Verfasser: | , |
| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
1996
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Management Science |
| Schlagworte: | Compensation Plans Agency Theory Incentive Contracts Salary-Incentive Mix Information Asymmetry Business Behavioral sciences Physical sciences Political science Economics |
| Zusammenfassung: | This research note reports results of a laboratory experiment conducted as a follow-up investigation of an earlier study by Umanath, Ray and Campbell (1993). Here, we focus on a specific unexpected result of Umanath et al. who found evidence contradicting the theoretical prediction with respect to the impact of environmental uncertainty on the composition of compensation contracts. Umanath et al., in retrospect, offered an explanation for their unexpected finding based on an alternative theory under the same agency framework. Our results not only ratify the alternative explanation offered by Umanath et al., but also identify information symmetry/asymmetry as the contingent factor capable of reconciling the apparently contradicting predictions of the two agency-based theories used in this research. |
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| ISSN: | 15265501 |