Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Procedure
Theories of equilibrium selection in non-cooperative games, as well as the notion of risk dominance, depend heavily on the so-called linear tracing procedure. This is the first paper to give direct, simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure. The first proof utilizes a result t...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Economic Theory. - Springer, 1991. - 15(2000), 2, Seite 485-490 |
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2000
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Economic Theory |
| Schlagworte: | Non-cooperative game theory Tracing procedure Equilibrium selection Browder's fixed point theorem C72 Mathematics Philosophy Social sciences Economics |
| Zusammenfassung: | Theories of equilibrium selection in non-cooperative games, as well as the notion of risk dominance, depend heavily on the so-called linear tracing procedure. This is the first paper to give direct, simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure. The first proof utilizes a result that is related to Kakutani's fixed point theorem and that is an extension of Browder's fixed point theorem. The second proof shows that it is even possible to avoid the use of correspondences. |
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| ISSN: | 14320479 |