Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Procedure
Theories of equilibrium selection in non-cooperative games, as well as the notion of risk dominance, depend heavily on the so-called linear tracing procedure. This is the first paper to give direct, simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure. The first proof utilizes a result t...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Economic Theory. - Springer, 1991. - 15(2000), 2, Seite 485-490 |
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2000
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Economic Theory |
| Schlagworte: | Non-cooperative game theory Tracing procedure Equilibrium selection Browder's fixed point theorem C72 Mathematics Philosophy Social sciences Economics |
| Online verfügbar |
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