Cost Information Sharing with Uncertainty Averse Firms

Cost Information Sharing with Uncertainty Averse Firms

A homogeneous Cournot duopoly with asymmetric information is analyzed. Every firm learns its own marginal cost parameter, but not the marginal cost parameter of the opponent. Every firm can commit to revealing its private information to the other firm, i.e. to share information. The influence of unc...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economic Theory. - Springer, 1991. - 23(2004), 4, Seite 879-907
1. Verfasser: Tapking, Jens (VerfasserIn)
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2004
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Economic Theory
Schlagworte:Choquet utility theory Uncertainty aversion Information sharing in oligopoly D43 D81 D82 Information science Economics Behavioral sciences Mathematics
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520 |a A homogeneous Cournot duopoly with asymmetric information is analyzed. Every firm learns its own marginal cost parameter, but not the marginal cost parameter of the opponent. Every firm can commit to revealing its private information to the other firm, i.e. to share information. The influence of uncertainty aversion on the readiness of the duopolists to share cost information is analyzed. Uncertainty aversion is modeled according to the Choquet utility theory. It is shown that low uncertainty aversion leads the firms to share information, while high uncertainty aversion leads the firms not to share. A simple economic explanation for this result is given. 
540 |a Copyright 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 
650 4 |a Choquet utility theory 
650 4 |a Uncertainty aversion 
650 4 |a Information sharing in oligopoly 
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650 4 |a Economics  |x Economic disciplines  |x Financial economics  |x Financial market structures  |x Economic competition  |x Imperfect competition  |x Oligopolies  |x Duopolies 
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