Cost Information Sharing with Uncertainty Averse Firms

A homogeneous Cournot duopoly with asymmetric information is analyzed. Every firm learns its own marginal cost parameter, but not the marginal cost parameter of the opponent. Every firm can commit to revealing its private information to the other firm, i.e. to share information. The influence of unc...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Economic Theory. - Springer, 1991. - 23(2004), 4, Seite 879-907
1. Verfasser: Tapking, Jens (VerfasserIn)
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2004
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Economic Theory
Schlagworte:Choquet utility theory Uncertainty aversion Information sharing in oligopoly D43 D81 D82 Information science Economics Behavioral sciences Mathematics