A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability

A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability

The goal of choice-theoretic derivations of subjective probability is to separate a decision maker's underlying beliefs (subjective probabilities of events) from their preferences (attitudes toward risk). Classical derivations have all relied upon some form of the Marschak-Samuelson "Indep...

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Veröffentlicht in:Econometrica. - Wiley. - 60(1992), 4, Seite 745-780
1. Verfasser: Machina, Mark J. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Schmeidler, David
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 1992
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Econometrica
Schlagworte:Subjective probability uncertainty subjective uncertainty non-expected utility theory expected utility theory Leonard J. Savage Economics Mathematics Philosophy
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520 |a The goal of choice-theoretic derivations of subjective probability is to separate a decision maker's underlying beliefs (subjective probabilities of events) from their preferences (attitudes toward risk). Classical derivations have all relied upon some form of the Marschak-Samuelson "Independence Axiom" or the Savage "Sure-Thing Principle," which imply that preferences over lotteries conform to the expected utility hypothesis. This paper presents a choice-theoretic derivation of subjective probability, in a Savage-type setting of purely subjective uncertainty, which neither assumes nor implies that the decision maker's preferences over lotteries necessarily conform to the expected utility hypothesis. 
540 |a Copyright 1992 Econometric Society 
650 4 |a Subjective probability 
650 4 |a uncertainty 
650 4 |a subjective uncertainty 
650 4 |a non-expected utility theory 
650 4 |a expected utility theory 
650 4 |a Leonard J. Savage 
650 4 |a Economics  |x Microeconomics  |x Economic utility  |x Expected utility 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Applied mathematics  |x Statistics  |x Applied statistics  |x Descriptive statistics  |x Statistical distributions  |x Distribution functions  |x Probability distributions 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Pure mathematics  |x Probability theory  |x Probabilities 
650 4 |a Philosophy  |x Axiology  |x Ethics  |x Normative ethics  |x Eudaimonism  |x Utilitarianism  |x Preference utilitarianism 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Pure mathematics  |x Probability theory  |x Kolmogorovs axioms 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Pure mathematics  |x Probability theory 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Pure mathematics  |x Probability theory  |x Probabilities  |x Conditional probabilities 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Mathematical analysis  |x Mathematical monotonicity 
650 4 |a Economics  |x Microeconomics  |x Economic utility 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Mathematical expressions  |x Axioms 
655 4 |a research-article 
700 1 |a Schmeidler, David  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Econometrica  |d Wiley  |g 60(1992), 4, Seite 745-780  |w (DE-627)270425721  |w (DE-600)1477253-X  |x 14680262  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:60  |g year:1992  |g number:4  |g pages:745-780 
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