Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

This paper studies the sequential equilibria of signaling games. It introduces a new solution concept, divine equilibrium, that refines the set of sequential equilibria by requiring that off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy an additional restriction. This restriction rules out implausible sequen...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Econometrica. - Wiley. - 55(1987), 3, Seite 647-661
1. Verfasser: Banks, Jeffrey S. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Sobel, Joel
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 1987
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Econometrica
Schlagworte:Strategic stability equilibrium selection signaling game theory Mathematics Religion Economics Philosophy Law
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520 |a This paper studies the sequential equilibria of signaling games. It introduces a new solution concept, divine equilibrium, that refines the set of sequential equilibria by requiring that off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy an additional restriction. This restriction rules out implausible sequential equilibria in many examples. We show that divine equilibria exist by demonstrating that a sequential equilibrium that fails to be divine cannot be in a stable component. However, the stable component of signaling games is typically smaller than the set of divine equilibria. We demonstrate this fact through examples. We also present a characterization of the stable equilibria in generic signaling games. 
540 |a Copyright 1987 The Econometric Society 
650 4 |a Strategic stability 
650 4 |a equilibrium selection 
650 4 |a signaling 
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