Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
This paper studies the sequential equilibria of signaling games. It introduces a new solution concept, divine equilibrium, that refines the set of sequential equilibria by requiring that off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy an additional restriction. This restriction rules out implausible sequen...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Econometrica. - Wiley. - 55(1987), 3, Seite 647-661 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
1987
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Econometrica |
| Schlagworte: | Strategic stability equilibrium selection signaling game theory Mathematics Religion Economics Philosophy Law |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper studies the sequential equilibria of signaling games. It introduces a new solution concept, divine equilibrium, that refines the set of sequential equilibria by requiring that off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy an additional restriction. This restriction rules out implausible sequential equilibria in many examples. We show that divine equilibria exist by demonstrating that a sequential equilibrium that fails to be divine cannot be in a stable component. However, the stable component of signaling games is typically smaller than the set of divine equilibria. We demonstrate this fact through examples. We also present a characterization of the stable equilibria in generic signaling games. |
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| ISSN: | 14680262 |
| DOI: | 10.2307/1913604 |