Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts

We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function of t...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	The Accounting Review. - American Accounting Association. - 78(2003), 4, Seite 957-981
1. Verfasser:	Core, John E. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Guay, Wayne R., Verrecchia, Robert E.
Format:	Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	2003
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:	The Accounting Review
Schlagworte:	Agency Theory Cash Pay Total Compensation Equity Incentives Economics Business Mathematics Behavioral sciences Applied sciences