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|a (DE-627)JST000444227
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|a (JST)3203286
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|a DE-627
|b ger
|c DE-627
|e rakwb
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|a eng
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|a Core, John E.
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
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|a Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts
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|c 2003
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|a Text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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|a We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function of the relative variances. Agency theory speaks to the weights in total compensation (annual total pay and changes in the CEO's equity portfolio value), however, and we document that very little of CEOs' total incentives come from cash pay. We also document that variation in the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO total compensation is an increasing function of the relative variances. The conflicting results using total compensation indicate that existing findings on cash pay cannot be interpreted as evidence supporting standard agency predictions. Based on our results, we suggest approaches for future research on performance measure use in CEO total compensation.
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|a Copyright 2003 American Accounting Association
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|a Agency Theory
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|a Cash Pay
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|a Total Compensation
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|a Equity Incentives
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|a Economics
|x Economic disciplines
|x Labor economics
|x Employment
|x Occupations
|x Businesspeople
|x Business executives
|x Chief executive officers
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|a Business
|x Business administration
|x Business management
|x Performance management
|x Performance metrics
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|a Mathematics
|x Applied mathematics
|x Statistics
|x Applied statistics
|x Statistical results
|x Statistical properties
|x Statistical discrepancies
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|a Economics
|x Macroeconomics
|x Money
|x Cash
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|a Economics
|x Economic disciplines
|x Financial economics
|x Finance
|x Financial instruments
|x Financial securities
|x Capital stocks
|x Stock prices
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|a Business
|x Business administration
|x Human resources
|x Employee motivation
|x Productivity incentives
|x Incentive pay
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|a Economics
|x Economic disciplines
|x Financial economics
|x Finance
|x Financial instruments
|x Financial securities
|x Dilutive securities
|x Stock options
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|a Behavioral sciences
|x Behavioral economics
|x Behavioral finance
|x Financial incentives
|x Contract incentives
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|a Business
|x Business administration
|x Corporate governance
|x Proxy fights
|x Proxy statements
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|a Applied sciences
|x Research methods
|x Survey research
|x Survey responses
|x Proxy reporting
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|a research-article
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1 |
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|a Guay, Wayne R.
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
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1 |
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|a Verrecchia, Robert E.
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
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0 |
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|i Enthalten in
|t The Accounting Review
|d American Accounting Association
|g 78(2003), 4, Seite 957-981
|w (DE-627)338766812
|w (DE-600)2064580-6
|x 00014826
|7 nnns
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|g volume:78
|g year:2003
|g number:4
|g pages:957-981
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|u https://www.jstor.org/stable/3203286
|3 Volltext
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|d 78
|j 2003
|e 4
|h 957-981
|