EPR system based on a reward and punishment mechanism : Producer-led product recycling channels

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Waste management (New York, N.Y.). - 1999. - 103(2020) vom: 15. Feb., Seite 198-207
1. Verfasser:	Zhao, Yan (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Wang, Wenju, Ni, Yuan
Format:	Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	2020
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:	Waste management (New York, N.Y.)
Schlagworte:	Journal Article Evolutionary game Extended producer responsibility (EPR) Reverse supply chain Reward and punishment mechanism Stackelberg game

Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. The discussion level of green development is constantly and exponentially growing, and the extended producer responsibility (EPR) system has become an important choice for the sustainable development of enterprises. To effectively manage the recycling of waste goods, this study uses the evolutionary game model to analyse the effectiveness of the reward and punishment mechanism for the implementation of the EPR system and builds a producer-led reverse closed-loop supply chain model under effective conditions. Then, we compare and analyse the channel selection of producers in carrying out the reverse supply chain under the different mechanisms of rewards and punishments. The findings are as follows. (1) The choice of producers regarding the implementation of the EPR system is affected by the reward and punishment mechanism. (2) Through the comparison of different models of recycling channels, it is found that producer-led independent recycling channels have the highest efficiency. (3) The producer will choose either the entrusted distributor recycling channels or entrusted third-party recycling channels, according to the different rewards and punishments
Beschreibung:	Date Completed 19.05.2020 Date Revised 19.05.2020 published: Print-Electronic Citation Status MEDLINE
ISSN:	1879-2456
DOI:	10.1016/j.wasman.2019.12.034