Myopic Agency
I consider a dynamic principal-agent setting in which the agent repeatedly chooses between hidden long-term and short-term actions. Relative to the long-term action, the short-term action boosts output today but hurts output tomorrow. I explicitly characterize the optimal contract that always induce...
| Veröffentlicht in: | The Review of Economic Studies. - Review of Economic Studies Ltd.. - 85(2018), 2 (303), Seite 1352-1388 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2018
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | The Review of Economic Studies |
| Schlagworte: | Principal-agent Dynamic contract Myopia Robust contract Investment Bonus deferral Bonus bank Long-term Short-term Persistent moral hazard |
| Online verfügbar |
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