Monopoly regulation under asymmetric information: prices versus quantities
We compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs: fixing either the price or quantity. For each instrument, we consider sophisticated (screening) and simple (bunching) mechanisms. We characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare...
| Veröffentlicht in: | The RAND Journal of Economics. - Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., 1984. - 48(2017), 3, Seite 557-578 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2017
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | The RAND Journal of Economics |
| Schlagworte: | Economics Law Behavioral sciences Business |
| Online verfügbar |
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