Monopoly regulation under asymmetric information: prices versus quantities
We compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs: fixing either the price or quantity. For each instrument, we consider sophisticated (screening) and simple (bunching) mechanisms. We characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare...
Veröffentlicht in: | The RAND Journal of Economics. - Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., 1984. - 48(2017), 3, Seite 557-578 |
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Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
2017
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Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | The RAND Journal of Economics |
Schlagworte: | Economics Law Behavioral sciences Business |
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