Quota Markets and Technological Change

Quota or permit markets have become an important tool for climate and energy policy, as they not only promise allocative efficiency but also provide a market based selection of the best new technological options. We analyze their effect on technological change in a case where several technologies co...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - The University of Chicago Press, 2014. - 4(2017), 4, Seite 1199-1228
1. Verfasser: Lechthaler-Felber, Giulia (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Krysiak, Frank C.
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2017
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
Schlagworte:H23 Q38 Q55 Climate change Investment Promotion of renewable energy Quota markets R&D Technological change Technological lock-in Tradable permits
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520 |a Quota or permit markets have become an important tool for climate and energy policy, as they not only promise allocative efficiency but also provide a market based selection of the best new technological options. We analyze their effect on technological change in a case where several technologies could be developed and where R&D firms are granted patents with a finite lifetime. We show that R&D incentives are not only too low, as is well known, but incentives are also distorted across technologies, which is a new result. Compared to the social optimum, the best technology is developed in too few cases, whereas a less promising technology might be developed too often. This distortion is difficult to correct, as information about new technologies is usually missing. However, we show that combining a quota market with a simple tax-subsidy scheme can correct some of these distortions, even if the regulator has no information regarding the properties of new technologies. 
540 |a © 2017 by The Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 
650 4 |a H23 
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650 4 |a Technological lock-in 
650 4 |a Tradable permits 
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