U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY Denying China a Conventional First-Strike Capability

U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY : Denying China a Conventional First-Strike Capability

In the most likely scenario, a high-intensity conflict between the United States and China would be confined to conventional weapons, owing to Beijing’s desire to avoid nuclear escalation. To protect the global security order and the tenuous balance of power on the world stage, the United States and...

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Veröffentlicht in:Naval War College Review. - U.S. Naval War College Press. - 72(2019), 2, Seite 35-66
1. Verfasser: Goldsmith, Sam (VerfasserIn)
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2019
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Naval War College Review
Schlagworte:Business Applied sciences Political science Physical sciences
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520 |a In the most likely scenario, a high-intensity conflict between the United States and China would be confined to conventional weapons, owing to Beijing’s desire to avoid nuclear escalation. To protect the global security order and the tenuous balance of power on the world stage, the United States and its allies must craft a strategy to deny China this conventional first-strike option. 
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