The China—Pakistan—United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the "War on Terrorism"

The China—Pakistan—United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the "War on Terrorism"

The U.S. Navy SEAL raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and Islamabad's subsequent turn toward China have highlighted one of the most remarkable legacies of the Cold War: the persistence of a strategic triangle composed of China, Pakistan, and the United States. Throughout much of the Cold War, China...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Asian Affairs: An American Review. - Taylor & Francis, Ltd.. - 38(2011), 4, Seite 197-220
1. Verfasser: SMITH, PAUL J. (VerfasserIn)
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2011
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Asian Affairs: An American Review
Schlagworte:Law Political science Social sciences Business
LEADER 01000caa a22002652 4500
001 JST123883598
003 DE-627
005 20240625071408.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 190101s2011 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
035 |a (DE-627)JST123883598 
035 |a (JST)23526520 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rakwb 
041 |a eng 
100 1 |a SMITH, PAUL J.  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
245 1 4 |a The China—Pakistan—United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the "War on Terrorism" 
264 1 |c 2011 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a The U.S. Navy SEAL raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and Islamabad's subsequent turn toward China have highlighted one of the most remarkable legacies of the Cold War: the persistence of a strategic triangle composed of China, Pakistan, and the United States. Throughout much of the Cold War, China and the United States competed to keep Pakistan within their particular sphere of influence, while Pakistan deftly took advantage of the subtle power struggle to improve its security profile vis-à-vis India. Despite persistent competition, the nations of the strategic triangle enjoyed three major convergence points: (1) the 1969—71 period, when Pakistan acted as a conduit for secret talks between Beijing and Washington, which subsequently led to mutual coordination during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war; (2) the decade following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; and (3) the years following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, when global focus turned to Afghanistan and terrorism. This third convergence around terrorism is particularly salient, as Pakistan is increasingly viewed globally as both a source of terrorist activity and a victim of terrorist violence. In the long term, the strategic triangle may act as a modulating force that may prevent instability within nuclear-capable Pakistan, as well as constrain activities by certain Pakistani state organs that may be linked to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and clandestine support for militant organizations. 
540 |a Copyright © 2011 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. 
650 4 |a Law  |x Criminal law  |x Criminal offenses  |x Federal criminal offenses  |x Terrorism 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Politics  |x International politics  |x International relations  |x International disputes  |x Cold wars 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Military science  |x Armed conflict  |x War 
650 4 |a Social sciences  |x Anthropology  |x Ethnology  |x Ethnic groups  |x Asians 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Politics  |x International politics  |x International relations  |x International disputes  |x International sanctions  |x Trade sanctions  |x Economic sanctions 
650 4 |a Social sciences  |x Human geography  |x Political geography  |x Countries 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Military science  |x Armed conflict  |x War  |x Warfare  |x Unconventional warfare  |x Counterterrorism 
650 4 |a Social sciences  |x Behavioral sciences  |x Human behavior  |x Social behavior  |x Social interaction  |x Meetings 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Government  |x Government officials  |x Heads of state  |x Presidents 
650 4 |a Business  |x Business administration  |x Corporate communications  |x Memoranda 
655 4 |a research-article 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Asian Affairs: An American Review  |d Taylor & Francis, Ltd.  |g 38(2011), 4, Seite 197-220  |w (DE-627)341346519  |w (DE-600)2067365-6  |x 19401590  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:38  |g year:2011  |g number:4  |g pages:197-220 
856 4 0 |u http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2011.604291  |3 Volltext 
912 |a GBV_USEFLAG_A 
912 |a SYSFLAG_A 
912 |a GBV_JST 
912 |a GBV_ILN_11 
912 |a GBV_ILN_20 
912 |a GBV_ILN_22 
912 |a GBV_ILN_24 
912 |a GBV_ILN_26 
912 |a GBV_ILN_31 
912 |a GBV_ILN_39 
912 |a GBV_ILN_40 
912 |a GBV_ILN_60 
912 |a GBV_ILN_62 
912 |a GBV_ILN_63 
912 |a GBV_ILN_65 
912 |a GBV_ILN_69 
912 |a GBV_ILN_70 
912 |a GBV_ILN_90 
912 |a GBV_ILN_100 
912 |a GBV_ILN_110 
912 |a GBV_ILN_151 
912 |a GBV_ILN_206 
912 |a GBV_ILN_224 
912 |a GBV_ILN_285 
912 |a GBV_ILN_370 
912 |a GBV_ILN_374 
912 |a GBV_ILN_647 
912 |a GBV_ILN_702 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2001 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2003 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2005 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2006 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2007 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2008 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2009 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2010 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2011 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2014 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2015 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2018 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2020 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2021 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2025 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2026 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2027 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2031 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2034 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2038 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2044 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2048 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2050 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2055 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2056 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2057 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2061 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2088 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2093 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2107 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2111 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2113 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2190 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2336 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2470 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2507 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2548 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2937 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2949 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2950 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4012 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4035 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4037 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4046 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4112 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4125 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4126 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4242 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4246 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4249 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4251 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4305 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4306 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4307 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4313 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4322 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4323 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4326 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4335 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4338 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4346 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4393 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4700 
951 |a AR 
952 |d 38  |j 2011  |e 4  |h 197-220