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|a (JST)26456136
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|a DE-627
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|e rakwb
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|a spa
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|a González, Laura Zamudio
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
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|a LA COMISIÓN INTERNACIONAL CONTRA LA IMPUNIDAD EN GUATEMALA (CICIG). UNA ORGANIZACIÓN AUTORIDIGIDA / THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA (CICIG). A SELF-DIRECTED ORGANIZATION / LA COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE CONTRE L’IMPUNITÉ AU GUATEMALA (CICIG). UNE ORGANISATION INDÉPENDANTE
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|c 2018
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|a Text
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|a No pocos de los estudios sobre organizaciones internacionales intergubernamentales (ois) descartan que éstas sean autónomas o sean capaces de autodirigir sus procesos de cambio. El caso de la Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (cicig) permite precisamente observar en qué grado es autónoma una oi. Mediante el análisis documental y entrevistas con la dirigencia de la cicig, este artículo demuestra que la organización ajustó y reinterpretó su mandato como resultado de un proceso de decisiones internas y autónomas. Esta evidencia contribuye al debate sobre las ois en cuanto actores autodirigidos. Many studies on international intergovernmental organizations (ios) rule out there being autonomous or capable of self-directing their processes of change. The case of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (cicig) makes it possible precisely to observe to what degree an io is autonomous. Through documentary analysis and interviews with the leadership of the cicig, this article shows that the organization adjusted and reinterpreted its mandate as the result of a process of internal and autonomous decisions. This evidence contributes to the debate about ios as self-directed actors. D’assez nombreux travaux sur les organisations intergouvernementales (oig) mènent à croire qu’elles puissent être autonomes ou capables de diriger elles-mêmes leurs processus de changement. Le cas de la Commission internationale contre l’impunité au Guatemala (cicig) est justement un exemple d’autonomie. L’analyse documentaire et plusieurs enquêtes menées auprès des dirigeants de cette organisation nous permettent de dire que celle-ci a adapté et réinterprété son mandat au moyen de décisions internes et autonomes. L’évidence présentée ici pourrait contribuer au débat concernant les acteurs indépendants.
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|a © 2018 Foro Internacional Licencia
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|a Corrupción
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|a impunidad
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|a autonomía
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|a actor autodirigido
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|a Estado de derecho.
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|a Corruption
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|a impunity
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|a autonomy
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|a self-directed actor
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|a rule of law
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|a Corruption
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|a impunité
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|a autonomie
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|a acteur indépendant
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|a État de droit
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|a research-article
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|a Morayta, Gonzalo Celorio
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
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|a Mabire, Bernardo
|e verfasserin
|4 aut
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|i Enthalten in
|t Foro Internacional
|d Colegio de Mexico
|g 58(2018), 3 (233), Seite 493-536
|w (DE-627)513533370
|w (DE-600)2239486-2
|x 24486523
|7 nnns
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|g volume:58
|g year:2018
|g number:3 (233)
|g pages:493-536
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|u https://www.jstor.org/stable/26456136
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|d 58
|j 2018
|e 3 (233)
|h 493-536
|