The "Peer-Effect" in Counterterrorist Policies
Existing accounts posit that defensively oriented counterterrorist policies create negative externalities and result in regulatory competition that induces governments to increasingly tighten their policies. We argue that rather than causing an unconditional global "race to the top," spati...
| Publié dans: | International Organization. - Cambridge University Press. - 68(2014), 1, Seite 211-234 |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Autres auteurs: | , |
| Format: | Article en ligne |
| Langue: | English |
| Publié: |
2014
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| Accès à la collection: | International Organization |
| Sujets: | Political science Law Social sciences Information science Behavioral sciences Economics |
| Accès en ligne |
Volltext |