An Originalist Theory of Concepts
We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express....
Veröffentlicht in: | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. - Aristotelian Society. - 85(2011) vom: Jan., Seite 101-124 |
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Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
2011
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Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes |
Schlagworte: | History Philosophy Social sciences Physical sciences Behavioral sciences |
Zusammenfassung: | We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. |
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ISSN: | 14678349 |