AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE: : EVIDENCE FROM BANKING COMPANIES IN BANGLADESH

Corporate governance has become increasingly important in developed and developing countries just after a series of corporate scandals and failures in a number of countries. Corporate governance structure is often viewed as a means of corporate success despite prior studies reveal mixed, somewhere c...

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Veröffentlicht in:Society and Economy. - Akadémiai Kiadó, 2002. - 34(2012), 4, Seite 643-666
1. Verfasser: Ahmed, Hasnan (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Gábor, András
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2012
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Society and Economy
Schlagworte:corporate governance corporate performance governance mechanisms Bangladesh agency theory stewardship theory Business Political science Economics Law
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520 |a Corporate governance has become increasingly important in developed and developing countries just after a series of corporate scandals and failures in a number of countries. Corporate governance structure is often viewed as a means of corporate success despite prior studies reveal mixed, somewhere conflicting and ambiguous, and somewhere no relationship between governance structure and performance. This study empirically investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance of listed banking companies in Bangladesh by using two multiple regression models. The study reveals that a good number of companies do not comply with the regulatory requirements indicating remarkable shortfall in corporate governance practice. The companies are run by the professional managers having no duality and no ownership interest for which they are compensated by high remuneration to curb agency conflict. Apart from some inconsistent relationship between some corporate variables, the corporate governance mechanisms do not appear to have significant relationship with financial performances. The findings reveal an insignificant negative impact or somewhere no impact of independent directors and non-independent non-executive directors on the level of performance that strongly support the concept that the managers are essentially worthy of trust and earn returns for the owners as claimed by stewardship theory. The study provides support for the view that while much emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms is necessary to safeguard the interest of stakeholders; corporate governance on its own, as a set of codes or standards for corporate conformance, cannot make a company successful. Companies need to balance corporate governance mechanisms with performance by adopting strategic decision and risk management with the efficient utilization of the organization ’s resources. 
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