The Plurality of Concepts
Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Synthese. - Springer Science + Business Media. - 169(2009), 1, Seite 145-173 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2009
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Synthese |
| Schlagworte: | Concepts Representation Pluralism Categorization Psychological kinds History Behavioral sciences Biological sciences Philosophy |
| Online verfügbar |
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