Knowing and Supposing in Games of Perfect Information

The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the cond...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic. - Springer, 1953. - 86(2007), 3, Seite 353-373
1. Verfasser: Arló-Costa, Horacio (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Bicchieri, Cristina
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2007
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic
Schlagworte:Game Theory Hypothetical Knowledge Conditionals Common Knowledge Mathematics Philosophy Behavioral sciences