Pre-Electoral Commitments and Government Formation

Pre-Electoral Commitments and Government Formation

Recent studies show that pre-electoral commitments and the ideological distance between parties influence government formation. But do pre-electoral pacts or rejections of party combinations really have an independent impact on the outcome of the government formation game? Which policy areas matter...

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Veröffentlicht in:Public Choice. - Springer Science + Business Media. - 138(2009), 1/2, Seite 45-64
1. Verfasser: Debus, Marc (VerfasserIn)
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2009
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Public Choice
Schlagworte:Coalition theories Content analysis Ideological heterogeneity Pre-electoral commitments Endogeneity problems Political science Behavioral sciences Economics Mathematics Applied sciences Business
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520 |a Recent studies show that pre-electoral commitments and the ideological distance between parties influence government formation. But do pre-electoral pacts or rejections of party combinations really have an independent impact on the outcome of the government formation game? Which policy areas matter when parties agree to build a coalition? This paper addresses these questions by applying a dataset that includes information on preferred/rejected coalition partners and the policy-area specific programmatic heterogeneity of all potential coalitions. The results show that pre-electoral commitments have a significant impact on government formation after controlling for endogeneity problems. There is also evidence that not only diversity in economic issues determines the partisan composition of governments. 
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650 4 |a Coalition theories 
650 4 |a Content analysis 
650 4 |a Ideological heterogeneity 
650 4 |a Pre-electoral commitments 
650 4 |a Endogeneity problems 
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650 4 |a Political science  |x Political organizations  |x Political parties  |x Programmatic parties 
650 4 |a Business  |x Business administration  |x Employee relations  |x Labor management relations  |x Labor negotiations  |x Coalition bargaining 
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