Informational Limits to Democratic Public Policy: The Jury Theorem, Yardstick Competition, and Ignorance
Condorcet's jury theorem provides a possible explanation for the success of democracies relative to other forms of government. In its modern form, the jury theorem predicts that majority decisions are well informed, because they are based upon far more information than possessed by any single i...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Public Choice. - Springer Science + Business Media. - 132(2007), 3/4, Seite 333-352 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
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2007
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Public Choice |
| Schlagworte: | Jury theorem Rational ignorance Elections Delegation Expert's dilemma Information aggregation Yardstick competition Informational policies Liberal institutions Effectiveness of democracy mehr... |
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