Behavioral Experiments on Biased Voting in Networks

Behavioral Experiments on Biased Voting in Networks

Many distributed collective decision-making processes must balance diverse individual preferences with a desire for collective unity. We report here on an extensive session of behavioral experiments on biased voting in networks of individuals. In each of 81 experiments, 36 human subjects arranged in...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. - National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. - 106(2009), 5, Seite 1347-1352
1. Verfasser: Kearns, Michael (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Judd, Stephen, Tan, Jinsong, Wortman, Jennifer, Graham, Ronald L.
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2009
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Schlagworte:behavioral game theory collective decision making network science Applied sciences Mathematics Social sciences Business Behavioral sciences Philosophy Political science
LEADER 01000caa a22002652 4500
001 JST069866953
003 DE-627
005 20240622194648.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 150325s2009 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
035 |a (DE-627)JST069866953 
035 |a (JST)40272380 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rakwb 
041 |a eng 
100 1 |a Kearns, Michael  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Behavioral Experiments on Biased Voting in Networks 
264 1 |c 2009 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a Many distributed collective decision-making processes must balance diverse individual preferences with a desire for collective unity. We report here on an extensive session of behavioral experiments on biased voting in networks of individuals. In each of 81 experiments, 36 human subjects arranged in a virtual network were financially motivated to reach global consensus to one of two opposing choices. No payments were made unless the entire population reached a unanimous decision within 1 min, but different subjects were paid more for consensus to one choice or the other, and subjects could view only the current choices of their network neighbors, thus creating tensions between private incentives and preferences, global unity, and network structure. Along with analyses of how collective and individual performance vary with network structure and incentives generally, we find that there are well-studied network topologies in which the minority preference consistently wins globally; that the presence of "extremist" individuals, or the awareness of opposing incentives, reliably improve collective performance; and that certain behavioral characteristics of individual subjects, such as "stubbornness," are strongly correlated with earnings. 
650 4 |a behavioral game theory 
650 4 |a collective decision making 
650 4 |a network science 
650 4 |a Applied sciences  |x Engineering  |x Systems engineering  |x Systems design  |x Connectivity 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Pure mathematics  |x Geometry  |x Euclidean geometry  |x Plane geometry  |x Vertices 
650 4 |a Social sciences  |x Human geography  |x Social geography  |x Neighborhoods 
650 4 |a Business  |x Business administration  |x Human resources  |x Employee motivation  |x Productivity incentives  |x Group incentives 
650 4 |a Behavioral sciences  |x Human behavior  |x Social behavior  |x Group behavior  |x Group dynamics  |x Minority influence 
650 4 |a Philosophy  |x Applied philosophy  |x Philosophy of science  |x Scientific method  |x Experimentation 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Politics  |x Political processes  |x Political elections  |x Voting  |x Voting behavior 
650 4 |a Behavioral sciences  |x Human behavior  |x Social behavior  |x Group behavior  |x Group dynamics  |x Group processes  |x Group performance 
650 4 |a Behavioral sciences  |x Sociology  |x Human societies  |x Social institutions  |x Families  |x Family structure 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Applied mathematics  |x Statistics  |x Applied statistics  |x Descriptive statistics  |x Statistical distributions  |x Distribution functions  |x Probability distributions  |x Cumulative distribution functions 
650 4 |a Applied sciences  |x Engineering  |x Systems engineering  |x Systems design  |x Connectivity 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Pure mathematics  |x Geometry  |x Euclidean geometry  |x Plane geometry  |x Vertices 
650 4 |a Social sciences  |x Human geography  |x Social geography  |x Neighborhoods 
650 4 |a Business  |x Business administration  |x Human resources  |x Employee motivation  |x Productivity incentives  |x Group incentives 
650 4 |a Behavioral sciences  |x Human behavior  |x Social behavior  |x Group behavior  |x Group dynamics  |x Minority influence 
650 4 |a Philosophy  |x Applied philosophy  |x Philosophy of science  |x Scientific method  |x Experimentation 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Politics  |x Political processes  |x Political elections  |x Voting  |x Voting behavior 
650 4 |a Behavioral sciences  |x Human behavior  |x Social behavior  |x Group behavior  |x Group dynamics  |x Group processes  |x Group performance 
650 4 |a Behavioral sciences  |x Sociology  |x Human societies  |x Social institutions  |x Families  |x Family structure 
650 4 |a Mathematics  |x Applied mathematics  |x Statistics  |x Applied statistics  |x Descriptive statistics  |x Statistical distributions  |x Distribution functions  |x Probability distributions  |x Cumulative distribution functions 
655 4 |a research-article 
700 1 |a Judd, Stephen  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Tan, Jinsong  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Wortman, Jennifer  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Graham, Ronald L.  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America  |d National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America  |g 106(2009), 5, Seite 1347-1352  |w (DE-627)254235379  |w (DE-600)1461794-8  |x 10916490  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:106  |g year:2009  |g number:5  |g pages:1347-1352 
856 4 0 |u https://www.jstor.org/stable/40272380  |3 Volltext 
912 |a GBV_USEFLAG_A 
912 |a SYSFLAG_A 
912 |a GBV_JST 
912 |a GBV_ILN_11 
912 |a GBV_ILN_20 
912 |a GBV_ILN_22 
912 |a GBV_ILN_23 
912 |a GBV_ILN_24 
912 |a GBV_ILN_31 
912 |a GBV_ILN_39 
912 |a GBV_ILN_40 
912 |a GBV_ILN_60 
912 |a GBV_ILN_62 
912 |a GBV_ILN_63 
912 |a GBV_ILN_65 
912 |a GBV_ILN_69 
912 |a GBV_ILN_70 
912 |a GBV_ILN_73 
912 |a GBV_ILN_74 
912 |a GBV_ILN_90 
912 |a GBV_ILN_95 
912 |a GBV_ILN_100 
912 |a GBV_ILN_105 
912 |a GBV_ILN_110 
912 |a GBV_ILN_120 
912 |a GBV_ILN_151 
912 |a GBV_ILN_161 
912 |a GBV_ILN_168 
912 |a GBV_ILN_170 
912 |a GBV_ILN_171 
912 |a GBV_ILN_213 
912 |a GBV_ILN_230 
912 |a GBV_ILN_252 
912 |a GBV_ILN_285 
912 |a GBV_ILN_293 
912 |a GBV_ILN_370 
912 |a GBV_ILN_374 
912 |a GBV_ILN_381 
912 |a GBV_ILN_602 
912 |a GBV_ILN_702 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2001 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2003 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2005 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2006 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2009 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2010 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2011 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2014 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2015 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2018 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2020 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2021 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2026 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2027 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2044 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2050 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2057 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2061 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2088 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2107 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2110 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2190 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2360 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2943 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2946 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2949 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2951 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4012 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4035 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4037 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4046 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4112 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4125 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4126 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4242 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4249 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4251 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4305 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4306 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4307 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4313 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4322 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4323 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4324 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4325 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4335 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4338 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4346 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4367 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4393 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4700 
951 |a AR 
952 |d 106  |j 2009  |e 5  |h 1347-1352