George Bush's Management Style and Operation Desert Storm

The Persian Gulf War represented one of the few unambiguously successful uses of large-scale, military force by the United States since World War II. The success of Operation Desert Storm was in large measure a result of George Bush's management style in making political, diplomatic, and strate...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Presidential Studies Quarterly. - Wiley Periodicals, Inc.. - 25(1995), 2, Seite 251-265
1. Verfasser: Crabb, Cecil V. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Mulcahy, Kevin V.
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 1995
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Presidential Studies Quarterly
Schlagworte:Political science
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520 |a The Persian Gulf War represented one of the few unambiguously successful uses of large-scale, military force by the United States since World War II. The success of Operation Desert Storm was in large measure a result of George Bush's management style in making political, diplomatic, and strategic decisions. The elements in this success involved: the homogeneity and solidarity of the President's "inner circle"; the President's skills in personal diplomacy; the care that went into the building and maintenance of broad congressional and public approval for the war-effort. The success of Bush's elitist management style however, was limited essentially to foreign affairs rather than domestic and electoral politics. 
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