The Number of Outcomes in the Pareto-Optimal Set of Discrete Bargaining Games

A set of n players is to bargain over which one of m possible outcomes will be chosen. The preference of outcome i to player j is assumed to be a random variable with all preference rankings equally likely and without ties. This would arise in case the payoffs are chosen as independent samplings fro...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Mathematics of Operations Research. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - 6(1981), 4, Seite 571-578
1. Verfasser: O'Neill, Barry (VerfasserIn)
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 1981
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Mathematics of Operations Research
Schlagworte:Bargaining Pareto-optimality Multiattribute utility theory Mathematics Behavioral sciences Social sciences