The Effects of Risk Aversion on Production Decisions in Decentralized Organizations
This paper presents a principal-agent model in which subsequent to contracting the risk averse agent becomes informed about the production process. Communication of the agent's information is always valuable. The optimal contract given this information asymmetry is characterized by less product...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Management Science. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, 1954. - 39(1993), 7, Seite 794-805 |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Weitere Verfasser: | , |
| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
1993
|
| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Management Science |
| Schlagworte: | Agency Theory Asymmetric Information Efficiency Loss Risk Aversion Economics Business Behavioral sciences Information science Law |
| Online verfügbar |
Volltext |