Behavioral Consequences of Corporate Incentives and Long-Term Bonuses: An Experimental Study
This paper examines whether long-term managerial bonus schemes change the allocative behavior of subjects in a laboratory setting. Using four different compensation schemes, we show that a necessary condition for reconciling divergent time preferences between principals and agents is a compensation...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Management Science. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, 1954. - 38(1992), 9, Seite 1280-1298 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
1992
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Management Science |
| Schlagworte: | Experimental Economics Managerial Compensation Agency Theory Learning Business Economics Mathematics |
| Online verfügbar |
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