A Note on Strategic Sampling in Agencies
This paper studies sample design for process control in principal-agent settings where deterrence rather than ex post detection is the main issue. We show how the magnitude of gains from additional sampling can be calculated and traded off against sampling costs. It is shown that the optimal sample...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Management Science. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, 1954. - 42(1996), 1, Seite 151-156 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
1996
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Management Science |
| Schlagworte: | Sampling Value of Information Agency Theory Mathematics Economics |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper studies sample design for process control in principal-agent settings where deterrence rather than ex post detection is the main issue. We show how the magnitude of gains from additional sampling can be calculated and traded off against sampling costs. It is shown that the optimal sample size shrinks as target defect rates are lowered. |
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| ISSN: | 15265501 |