Between Intuition and Professionalism: Israeli Military Leadership during the 1948 Palestine War

Despite its achievements in the 1948 Palestine War, the military performance of the Israeli army was less impressive than is usually assumed. Attacks by the Israel Defense Force (IDF) on the regular Arab armies (Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi, and Egyptian) ended in most cases in Israel's defeat. Isr...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of Military History. - George C. Marshall Foundation and the Virginia Military Institute, 1989. - 68(2004), 3, Seite 885-909
1. Verfasser: Tal, David (VerfasserIn)
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2004
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:The Journal of Military History
Schlagworte:Political science Behavioral sciences History
LEADER 01000caa a22002652 4500
001 JST050029355
003 DE-627
005 20240621173646.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 150324s2004 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
035 |a (DE-627)JST050029355 
035 |a (JST)3396731 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rakwb 
041 |a eng 
100 1 |a Tal, David  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Between Intuition and Professionalism: Israeli Military Leadership during the 1948 Palestine War 
264 1 |c 2004 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a Despite its achievements in the 1948 Palestine War, the military performance of the Israeli army was less impressive than is usually assumed. Attacks by the Israel Defense Force (IDF) on the regular Arab armies (Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi, and Egyptian) ended in most cases in Israel's defeat. Israeli victories, which allowed the extension of the territories under its control, were gained in the fighting against the unorganized Palestinians and the semi-military Arab Liberation Army. The only significant military achievement in the war was the victory of Yigal Allon's forces over the Egyptians in southern Palestine. This success was gained at the conclusion of a debate between Allon and another IDF senior commander over the best way to conduct of offensive operations, a debate that provides a key to understanding the reason for Allon's remarkable achievement compared to the lesser performance of other IDF commanders. However, Allon's brilliant military leadership was the result of intuition and not of professional military education, a factor that had a negative effect on some of his decisions. 
540 |a Copyright 2004 Society for Military History 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Military science  |x Armed conflict  |x War 
650 4 |a Behavioral sciences  |x Anthropology  |x Applied anthropology  |x Cultural anthropology  |x Cultural institutions  |x Archives 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Military science  |x Armed forces  |x Armies 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Military science  |x Military defense 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Politics  |x International politics  |x International relations  |x International disputes  |x Invasion 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Military science  |x Military operations 
650 4 |a History  |x Historical methodology  |x Historiography  |x Military history 
650 4 |a Behavioral sciences  |x Psychology  |x Cognitive psychology  |x Intuition 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Military science  |x Command and control  |x Military strategy 
650 4 |a Political science  |x Politics  |x International politics  |x International relations  |x International cooperation 
655 4 |a research-article 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t The Journal of Military History  |d George C. Marshall Foundation and the Virginia Military Institute, 1989  |g 68(2004), 3, Seite 885-909  |w (DE-627)306714329  |w (DE-600)1501157-4  |x 15437795  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:68  |g year:2004  |g number:3  |g pages:885-909 
856 4 0 |u https://www.jstor.org/stable/3396731  |3 Volltext 
912 |a GBV_USEFLAG_A 
912 |a SYSFLAG_A 
912 |a GBV_JST 
912 |a GBV_ILN_11 
912 |a GBV_ILN_22 
912 |a GBV_ILN_24 
912 |a GBV_ILN_39 
912 |a GBV_ILN_40 
912 |a GBV_ILN_60 
912 |a GBV_ILN_69 
912 |a GBV_ILN_70 
912 |a GBV_ILN_120 
912 |a GBV_ILN_285 
912 |a GBV_ILN_702 
912 |a GBV_ILN_1200 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2001 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2003 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2005 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2007 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2008 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2009 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2010 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2011 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2015 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2027 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2190 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2548 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2875 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4012 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4035 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4037 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4112 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4305 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4306 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4322 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4324 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4325 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4393 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4700 
951 |a AR 
952 |d 68  |j 2004  |e 3  |h 885-909