The Oxford Experiment in H2X Radar Bombing

The Eighth Air Force, in England, established its operational research section in 1942, the first OR unit in the air force. The bombing accuracy subsection quickly established methods for using strike photographs to determine the accuracy of visual bombing. The cloud cover over Europe forced the air...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Interfaces. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - 23(1993), 5, Seite 50-55
1. Verfasser:	Price, G. Baley (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	1993
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:	Interfaces
Schlagworte:	Military Test and evaluation Professional MS/OR history Political science Applied sciences Behavioral sciences History


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100	1		\|a Price, G. Baley \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
245	1	4	\|a The Oxford Experiment in H2X Radar Bombing
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520			\|a The Eighth Air Force, in England, established its operational research section in 1942, the first OR unit in the air force. The bombing accuracy subsection quickly established methods for using strike photographs to determine the accuracy of visual bombing. The cloud cover over Europe forced the air force to bomb with H2X radar blind bombing equipment on many missions; the accuracy was poor. G. B. Price, the subsection's specialist on H2X bombing, used two combat planes and crews for simulated H2X bombing of two targets in Oxford to test the inherent accuracy of the equipment.
540			\|a Copyright 1993 The Institute of Management Sciences
650		4	\|a Military
650		4	\|a Test and evaluation
650		4	\|a Professional
650		4	\|a MS/OR history
650		4	\|a Political science \|x Military science \|x Armed conflict \|x War \|x Warfare \|x Conventional warfare \|x Bombings
650		4	\|a Political science \|x Military science \|x Armed forces \|x Air forces
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650		4	\|a Applied sciences \|x Engineering \|x Electrical engineering \|x Signal processing \|x Remote sensing \|x Radar
650		4	\|a Applied sciences \|x Engineering \|x Aerospace engineering \|x Aviation \|x Aircraft \|x Military aircraft \|x Attack aircraft \|x Bomber aircraft
650		4	\|a History \|x Historical methodology \|x Historiography \|x Military history \|x Special Section: The History of OR
655		4	\|a research-article
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952			\|d 23 \|j 1993 \|e 5 \|h 50-55