Level-K Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
This paper proposes a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete-information games based on "level-k" thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete-information games. We derive the model's implications in first- and second-price auctions...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Econometrica. - Wiley. - 75(2007), 6, Seite 1721-1770 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2007
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Econometrica |
| Schlagworte: | Common-value auctions Winner's curse Overbidding Bounded rationality Level-k model Nonequilibrium strategic thinking Behavioral game theory Experiments Economics Business mehr... |
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