Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the con...
| Veröffentlicht in: | Econometrica. - Wiley. - 69(2001), 4, Seite 1077-1098 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2001
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | Econometrica |
| Schlagworte: | Revelation Principle Mechanism Design Contract Theory Limited Commitment Asymmetric Information Mathematics Business Behavioral sciences Economics Law |
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