Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification
Abstract Contract theory typically holds that verification costs are obstacles to complete contracting; yet real‐world contracts often contain provisions that seem costly to verify. We show how verification (or litigation) costs operate as a screen on the promisee’s incentive to sue and as an effect...
| Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of Legal Studies. - The University of Chicago Law School. - 37(2008), 2, Seite 503-534 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
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2008
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | The Journal of Legal Studies |
| Schlagworte: | Law Economics Business Behavioral sciences Social sciences Albert |