The Lack of Consistency for Statistical Decision Procedures
Simpson's paradox exhibits seemingly deviant behavior where the data generated in independent experiments support a common decision, but the aggregated data support a different outcome. It is shown that this kind of inconsistent behavior occurs with many, if not most, statistical decision proce...
| Veröffentlicht in: | The American Statistician. - American Statistical Association, 1947. - 45(1991), 3, Seite 252-255 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
1991
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | The American Statistician |
| Schlagworte: | Bayesian Decision Theory Kruskal-Wallis Test Simpson's Paradox Philosophy Behavioral sciences Mathematics Information science |
| Zusammenfassung: | Simpson's paradox exhibits seemingly deviant behavior where the data generated in independent experiments support a common decision, but the aggregated data support a different outcome. It is shown that this kind of inconsistent behavior occurs with many, if not most, statistical decision processes. Examples are given for the Kruskal-Wallis test and a Bayesian decision problem. A simple theory is given that permits one to determine whether a given decision process admits such inconsistencies, to construct examples, and to find data restrictions that avoid such outcomes. |
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| ISSN: | 15372731 |
| DOI: | 10.2307/2684305 |