Sadat's Negotiations with the United States and Israel: Camp David and Blair House
The outcome of the negotiations between the Egyptians and the Americans and the Israelis reflected the balance of power between the negotiators in the period 1974-1979. But a realistic assessment of the forces at play at the beginning of negotiations in 1973 could have facilitated a far more effecti...
| Veröffentlicht in: | The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. - Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 1941. - 50(1991), 4, Seite 473-484 |
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
1991
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | The American Journal of Economics and Sociology |
| Schlagworte: | Law Political science Economics Behavioral sciences |
| Zusammenfassung: | The outcome of the negotiations between the Egyptians and the Americans and the Israelis reflected the balance of power between the negotiators in the period 1974-1979. But a realistic assessment of the forces at play at the beginning of negotiations in 1973 could have facilitated a far more effective utilization of the Arab coalition power that was successfully marshalled for the 1973 military operation and for the brief political battle which ensued. Anwar Sadat based his strategies on a highly personalistic assessment of the relevant policies of Israel and the United States, and of their respective relative power. Sadat's decision-making and his ability to make concessions was facilitated by the authoritarian character of his rule. The documentary record suggests that Egyptian decisions and negotiating strategies from Sinai to Camp David fundamentally reflected President Sadat's psycho-political perceptions and his highly personalized approach to diplomacy. |
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| ISSN: | 00029246 |