Broiler Production Contracts as a Multi-Agent Problem: Common Risk, Incentives and Heterogeneity
The broiler industry presents two puzzles regarding production contracts: why do processors control growers' inputs, and why do they use a statistically insufficient estimator to calculate growers' compensation? This paper provides an agency theoretic framework that explains these puzzles...
| Veröffentlicht in: | American Journal of Agricultural Economics. - Oxford University Press. - 82(2000), 3, Seite 606-622 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2000
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | American Journal of Agricultural Economics |
| Schlagworte: | agency theory production contracts Mathematics Business Law Economics Biological sciences Behavioral sciences Physical sciences |
| Online verfügbar |
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