An Experimental Investigation of Employer Discretion in Employee Performance Evaluation and Compensation

Employment relationships provide fertile ground for both employee and employer opportunism. Employers worry about whether employees will devote sufficient effort to work, and employees are concerned about whether employers will compensate them appropriately. In this paper, we examine whether employe...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	The Accounting Review. - American Accounting Association. - 80(2005), 2, Seite 563-583
1. Verfasser:	Fisher, Joseph G. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Maines, Laureen A., Peffer, Sean A., Sprinkle, Geoffrey B.
Format:	Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	2005
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:	The Accounting Review
Schlagworte:	Compensation Discretion Subjective Performance Evaluation Double-Sided Moral Hazard Business Behavioral sciences Economics Mathematics Applied sciences